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RESEARCH ARTICLE

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE EXISTING LEGAL SYSTEMS: REALITIES AND TRENDS

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SUMMARY
The article analyzes the legal regime of robots, evaluates the norm making attempts. As you know, today the issues of assigning robots and other carriers of Artificial Intelligence to legal subjectivity are being discussed. However, in the future legal norms will be updated in connection with the lack of responsibility in this context. With the assignment of rights to the robot, it is necessary to take into account the diversity of technologies and the above features. The article also investigates possible models of further regulation in the field of robotics. Proposals have been put forward to discuss the formation of a new strategy and legal standards in order to prevent gaps in the legal regulation of the use and application of AI, as well as important legal problems that have arisen as a result of ongoing research in this area at the present stage.

Key words: robot, robotics, Artificial Intelligence, legal capacity, legal regulation

1 | INTRODUCTION

Robots and artificial intelligence are increasingly used in modern everyday life, penetrating into many areas of human activity. It seems that humanity has been already morally accepted the fact that soon they will be everywhere, and will replace people not only professionally, but will also be smarter than the creator himself.

In these conditions, one of the important and topical areas of research in the field of jurisprudence is the problem of endowing robots with certain rights. This is based on the need to eliminate the gap in the application (distribution) of responsibility for the actions of robots, which cannot be overcome with the help of existing normative models (1) , . These topical issues for law much earlier (in the second half of the 1980s - early 1990s) began to be comprehended by various researchers, moving from the field of science fiction to the field of law. So, L. Solum in his work in 1992 asked the question whether Artificial Intelligence can become a person in the legal sense (legal person) (2) .

The theoretical substantiation of the ability of robots to take on the title of a "legal entity" and to have rights is based on the disclosure of the legal personality of an electronic person as an innovative entity, which is associated with the active use of digital technologies and robotics in almost all areas and the emergence of decentralized autonomous organizations "controlled by the so-called smart contracts" (3) .

2 | LEGAL CAPACITY CONCEPTS

Before starting the analysis of the definition of the legal capacity of robots, it should be understood the scientific definition of these concepts.

In the encyclopedic dictionary, legal capacity is

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understood as the ability of a person to have and exercise, directly or through a representative, legal rights and legal obligations, i.e. to be a subject of law. Legal capacity is a synthesis of legal capability and capacity to act, the so-called to act in legal capacity (4) . As G.A. Hajiyev accurately put it, the concepts of "subject of law", "entity", "legal capacity", "legal capability" are the "entrance ticket" to the legal world" (5) . These concepts are interrelated and complementary, and their relationship with the subjectivity of law is the core of legal capacity as a whole. Legal- and to act capacity are characterized by the recognition of a certain person's respective abilities. From the point of view of traditional legal science, it is possible to endow legal capacity in the case when legal capability and capacity to act intersect in time, merge together within an organization or in other collective entities or in capable adult citizens. Subjective law expresses the right to material and non-material benefits (6) . Human is the primary and main subject, that is, one who has the ability to share all other phenomena in the world in the "object-subject" logic, it is he (and only he at the present time) who endows certain representatives of the plant or animal world, natural objects, artificial (anthropogenic) objects or fictional objects as a property of the subject (7) .

It is important to determine legal capacity in our case because it presupposes the possibility of implementing legal obligations, and it is inseparably linked with delicacy, i.e. the ability to bear legal responsibility for offenses, which is extremely important in the conditions of autonomous decision-making by robots.

Since Soviet times, there has been a narrow definition of a legal entity, according to which organizations are recognized as a legal entity (Civil Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Chapter 4, Article 43). At the same time, there is another point of view, according to which a legal entity is an entity which is not a human ("any abstract concept that is assigned rights and obligations" (8) , "all entities in the legal sense, which are not human beings" (9) , "everything that, not being a human being, is capable of being a legal entity" (10)).

In such an interpretation of a legal entity, a person, his interests and the articulation of these interests within the framework of certain organizations, slip behind any subject of legal activity. That is, ultimately, behind any legal activity there is a human and only him. And this is understandable, since only man has self-awareness. Opponents of giving robots any rights insist on this fact. So, in an interview with the vc.ru news portal in the field of technology, a well-known engineer in the field of robotics, the creator of an android who works for an insurance company, Nadia Talmann unequivocally states that "a robot cannot have self-awareness": "I am against rights for robots. Android is not a person. This is a simulation of a human. And the simulation cannot have rights: what rights can one contemplate if the robot has no consciousness and emotions" (11) .

However, supporters of granting rights to robots believe that the fallacy of this assumption lies in the fact that the reasonable robot (android) is not at all an analogue of an animal or any artificial (fictional) entity known to legal science. Despite all the standard approach to creating a new subject, the distinguishing features of this result of human activity is the presence of rationality in his actions. As a result, society receives a new participant in social life, capable of independently and sometimes unpredictably for the creator himself to act in the external world.

On the other hand, the law itself has experienced new trends and is receptive to innovations. The reason for this was the changing reality, which poses new tasks for jurisprudence, however, as well as for other social sciences. Due to the new postclassical vision of the modern social world, jurisprudence is able to answer the pressing issues of current reality. As researchers and scholars in the field of law note, "the study of the legal categories of freedom, legal capacity, legal status, as well as law in general, claims to go beyond the usual framework of the classical paradigm of understanding law as a "state-organized" rational "hierarchy of norms" that exists objectively and rather autonomously in relation to legal consciousness and intersubjective interactions. The place of the classical dialectical methodology for studying object-subject and subject-subject relations, declared "one-line" and "one-dimensional", in the modern legal understanding was taken by the concept of law as a complexly organized synergistic environment of legal communications, which includes, in addition to the "state-organized" normative system and "self-reproducing," horizontally

organized" ("heterarchy")" (12) .

In the light of changes in the sphere of legal relations of subjects, one should refer to the already known definitions of legal capacity, allowing a broader interpretation of this legal term. To help of modern theorists can come the already classical doctrine of "Pure Theory of Law" G. Kelsen, according to which, in order to also have legal obligations and subjective rights, it is necessary "to be a person" or "have legal capacity." "Pure Theory of Law" explains the concept of a person - a subject of law as a personified unity of a set of legal norms that provide legal obligations and subjective rights, which have certain behavior (actions) as their content (13) . Therefore, the subject of law is not a natural reality, but "a construction created by jurisprudence ... for describing legally significant factual structures" (13) . Such a definition allows one to personify capable subjects of law not only within the framework of a person and his organizations. The fact is that the philosopher and theorist G. Kelsen allows abstracting the concept of law, separating it from its material essence, i.e. from a person and his activities. Through such a structure of a legal entity, in principle, it is possible to endow any phenomenon (a natural object, a living being, a fictional subject) with subjectivity, including robots created by human. Consequently, the robot turns into a subject of law with its own set of legal obligations and rights, the content of which is the actions of artificial intelligence.

3 | LEGAL CAPACITY OF MODERN CARRIERS WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The problems that complicate legislative decisions in the field of artificial intelligence, in the resources reasonably notes the rapidly development of technologies (compared to regulation) and the limited mechanisms of ensuring compliance with legal norms (14) .

At the same time, it does not have a fundamental meaning, how you call the new subject: "robot", "electronic entity", "mechanical entity", and "biomechanical entity". It is important how much rights this human-derived entity will be endowed with by its creator. Moreover, it should be noted that along with a robot in the modern world with the appearance of completely new results of the development of human society in the process of its interaction with nature, completely different phenomena of the artificial world appear. Among them, can also note humans bred from artificial embryos, clones, androids, cyborgs. As Academician V.S. Stepin rightly notes, the basic human interaction with nature is a practical activity in the process of which he assigns the substance and energy of nature (source material), transforming them into forms suitable for his consumption, and in order to purposefully change the source material, a man needs various means that serve as conductors of influence on the transformed subject and are amplifiers of its natural organs (15) .

Thus, in the near future, legal scholars will face the question of empowering not only robots, but also many other results of modern human activity. We have already studied this problem in the article "Latest technologies and threats to human rights" (16) However, unlike, for example, a human conceived from an artificial embryo, robots or electronic / mechanical faces, although they are also the result of human activity, but with their help, a man, on the one hand, wanted to alleviate or completely rid himself of those harmful to his own health for any reason, physically impracticable, the most difficult, exhausting activities requiring the use of significant resources (as was already proposed in the science fiction work "R.U.R." by K. Capek - the author from whose works the word "robot" was borrowed), on the other hand, to expand their capabilities without affecting the morphological structure of a human, as, for example, with cyborgs. This functional purpose of robots can be traced in the special literature, where robotics is considered as formed in the 60s of 20th century, the science "about technical devices that can replace a human when performing complex, monotonous, tedious, unsafe work" (17) .

And if the first robots fully met these approaches, representing special equipment - a manipulator controlled according to a certain program (in some documents the words "robot" and "manipulator" are synonyms [3; 4.]), then with the development of technology devices appear which began to copy the principles of the human brain using artificial neural networks capable of recognizing images, understanding human speech, and self-learning (18) . The main

goal of applying Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology is the development of algorithms that provide a computer solution to cognitive tasks inherent in the human brain (19) (20) . With the further development of this technology, the functional purpose of robots acquired new tasks and production took a new direction. As a result, robots began to acquire new social tasks, integrating into various spheres of modern production and infrastructure (robot-policeman, robot-nurse, robot-bank employee, etc.), i.e. we can come to the conclusion that robots began to "socialize". Thus, in legal science, the opinion begins to prevail that in some respects a robot acts, if not a subject, then a participant (21) .

In the light of research the types of modern electronic / mechanized entity, it should be noted that modern experts do not always equate the concepts of "Robot" and "Artificial Intelligence". For example, the April 26, 2018 report of the US Congressional Research Service on artificial intelligence notes the fact that, largely due to significantly different approaches, there is no consensus in the academic environment regarding the definition of Artificial Intelligence. At the same time, researchers, as a rule, distinguish between the concepts of "Robot" and "Artificial Intelligence", and most of them agree that artificial intelligence is a necessary element of an autonomous system (22) . Those who do not share artificial intelligence with a robot argue that intelligent robots with machine learning capabilities not only use a huge amount of available data, but also draw it from their own experience and incoming information (23) , adapting their behavior and improving their qualities when interacting with the outside world. Among them we can single out H. Eidenmüller, who considers the robot as embodied AI. The existing contradiction is trying to eliminate by N. Richards and W. Smart, who define a robot of a new generation as a non-biological autonomous agent (24) . In their opinion, such a robot is distinguished by a high degree of autonomy and acts as an agent of a person or an organization. R. Kahlo tried to generalize the existing approaches, defining modern robots as mechanical objects, 1) perceiving the world, 2) processing the received information, 3) affecting the environment (25) .

The idea of a modern robot that claims to be a legal framework is that technology combines all three of these qualities. Noting the impact on the environment, we mean, first of all, the real world, although discussions about the borderline states of the virtual and real are part of the modern scientific and legal discourse (26) . At the same time, it should be taken into account the fact that, since artificial intelligence generates complex behavioral patterns and the ability to develop adaptive properties and, as a consequence, the ability to self-development of new robots or electronic / mechanical entities, in turn, generates the ability unpredictable reaction on its part, and with the empowerment the commission of uncontrollable acts. Such negative conclusions should not belittle the advantages of robots with artificial intelligence, their ability to create original, possibly not belonging to any person, texts, images, thereby testing the strength of the legal regulation of intellectual property (27) . Consequently, the empowerment of robots should take into account all the variety of types of modern technologies and the above specifics.

4 | FEATURES OF THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF ROBOTS

Back in 1992, Harvard University professor Leon Wein, in his article "The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Towards An Automation of Jurisprudence" in the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, suggests considering autonomous machines either as traditionally perceived tools among people, or as inanimate addicts legal agents of the human principal (28) . The author himself is of the opinion that technology, endowed with artificial intelligence, is capable of autonomy and therefore evolves to a state where some machines will have responsibilities. As a result of such a modification, such machines are already legal entities or, as L. Wein called them in his work, "legal agents" with a certain set of responsibilities for their actions. However, due to the fact that such devices as a result of their activities produce unconscious responsibility, unlike people performing similar tasks, it is more correct to consider them as "incomplete" legal persons (28) . The corresponding approach in the future will support P. Asaro, who will propose to endow robots as quasi-agents or quasi-persons with rights and obligations only partially (29) . In accordance with this logic,

the limited rights of the subject of legal relations are largely justified by the robots' lack of consciousness and will, as well as the "artificiality" of their intelligence.

Over time, the nature of the machines themselves is changing, endowing them with the aforementioned artificial intelligence makes them more independent in making their own decisions. And then we have to decide whether they are persons (subjects of law). This fact could not but affect the perception of such machines by humans. As a reflection of these changes, appear more daring solutions to the issue of the legal personality of robots or, as they have already become known, electronic / mechanical persons. A striking example is the point of view of the futurologist G. Dvorsky, who in a more detailed form raises the question of the legal capacity of robots (30) .

Such a conclusion of the futurologist is based on an understanding of progress, which will inevitably lead to the emergence of robotic androids, as a class of machines that pose questions of an ontological nature to humanity.

Thus, the development of technology, which is ahead of the legal reality today, actualizes the need for a new approach to the issue of legal capacity. The ongoing discussions in the scientific community can be divided into two large groups. The first should include representatives of traditional law, who continue to restrict the action of legal personality only by human, as the only subject with self-awareness. Among these supporters, oddly enough, people with technical education, engineers, designers of robots and other products with artificial intelligence prevail. In their opinion, people who talk about self-awareness in robots approach this from a philosophical, not from an engineering position. They are mistaken because they see the similarity of an android to a human: a robot simulates our behavior. But it has no feelings or thinking (11) . Perhaps the opinion of specialists in this case is closer to the existing reality, since they are directly at the origins of these processes, and who, if not them, should assess the degree of intelligence of androids and robots equipped with artificial intelligence. However, that is why they are experts in the current state of such products. Most likely, philosophers and based on their conclusions sociologists, psychologists, lawyers and etc., should reason and foresee.

Nowadays the most active and in demand is the second group of researchers They accept the need to recognize legal capacity for modern autonomous machines, but, like the aforementioned professor L. Wein, they limit it only within the "legal entity". This approach requires further research to clarify the range of these individuals, the depth of their responsibility, as well as the rights awarded to these individuals.

The third group of authors, following G. Dvorsky, suggests that the development of machines has reached a certain level and there is no longer any compelling reason to deny robots rights, since this is "like discrimination and slavery." In such a justification, along with technological aspects, there is a moral and ethical side, which almost prevails among them. Supporters of this moral and ethical aspect can be attributed to the third group of researchers. We find this point of view, for example, in W. Harzog, but from a slightly different angle. In his conclusions, he refers to the studies of K. Darling (31) , whose works confirm the human tendency to form emotional connections with humanoid robots. That is, here we can state the expansion of this moral and ethical aspect of the psychological perspective, according to which violence against humanoid robots affects people themselves. The researcher proposes a situation when someone, having stabbed such a robot, can thereby manifest inhuman qualities, which will affect both his life and the lives of other people. And from this point of view, it is advisable to endow robots with rights (32) . This perspective is enriched by other generalized approaches to specific life circumstances: not to be disconnected (against his "will"), the right to full and unhindered access to own code, the right not to be experimented with, the right to create a copy of itself, the right to inviolability of "private life" (33) .

The empowerment of robots is reminiscent of the well-known discussions about animal rights, which humanism does not allow to be considered faceless property. Some authors use this analogy in their argumentation. Thus, A. Siddick draws attention to the fact that the recognition of rights for animals is a reminder that not only people can be endowed with rights (34) . As an example of such a humanistic argumentation, other arguments of a humanistic

nature can be cited (35) .

However, the traditional argumentation remains in force, according to which a machine will remain a machine, it will never surpass a human, it will never receive (should not receive) any rights, and even more so the rights inherent in a human. Their position is unchanged - they are ready to regard robots in the legal sense as nothing more than slaves, but certainly not "partners" of people (36) . To the strength of such argumentation is added the fear of its supporters that respect for the fundamental rights of robots will doom humanity, following the logic of development, to extinction as a result of natural selection (37) .

The granting of rights to robots in the form of assigning them the status of a legal entity in the status of an "electronic entity" also raises the problem of differentiating these rights among the robots themselves. As L.Wein notes again in his article, along with the granting of rights, different robots will receive a different volume of these rights, forming a hierarchy of legal statuses of robots. Wein argues that the most advanced devices will be able to rise above the status of a legal agent and - by analogy with corporations - be endowed with a fairly significant amount of rights and obligations (28) . In accordance with such a division, an electronic or mechanical entity which is more advanced in terms of intelligence and, most importantly, autonomy, can be endowed with rights for the results of its own production, which will take into account the specifics of these rights, the specifics of their implementation and access to these products. It is also important how the property sphere, the capabilities of this entity will be described (for example, the obligatory endowment of funds supported at the level established by law, in the absence of which the question of the termination of the existence of such an entity may arise).

The next step in analyzing the quality of the legal personality of robots or electronic / mechanical persons should be to clarify the degree of human presence in their activities. From the degree of the human's presence behind this new personality (whether it will actually or nominally be present, or in the future his presence will be "erased" as much as possible), can be drawn a conclusion about the quality of its legal capacity.

Designating the problem field associated with the possibility and feasibility of endowing robots or electronic / mechanical entities with legal capacity, it should be noted that when forming the concept of an electronic / mechanical entity, it is possible to apply conceptual approaches to the study of the concept of a legal entity, developed by G. Kelsen within the framework of his "pure law" (38) . Robots or electronic / mechanical entities can be recognized as subjects of law, in conditions that they are legally recognized with certain rights and obligations.

As a result of human activity and created to facilitate its activities, a robot or an electronic / mechanical entity performs certain functions specified by its developers. Like any functioning mechanism, this entity can fulfill or violate the duties assigned to him. The natural question is arise, who will be responsible for possible errors in the functioning of this robot? The choice for the answer is not big: it must either be the electronic entity itself or it must be an artificial intelligence developer.

This problem was actualized as a result of an increase in the autonomy of artificial intelligence, as well as an increase in the number of deaths as a result of "decision-making" by such intelligence. For example, a traffic accident happened in the United States. So, as a result of an incorrect assessment of the situation by the Tesla self-drive vehicle, when a car collided with a truck and the driver died, who did not have time to take control (39) .

In this regard, let us recall the words of the founder of the Tesla car, I. Mask, who said that neither road accidents, nor plane crashes, nor lack of drugs or poor-quality food can compare in the level of danger with the development of artificial intelligence, and called for the introduction of a state control over the implementation of appropriate technologies (40) .

In the requirements for the design, development and production of this class of industrial robots, in particular, it is stated that during the development (design) of a machine and (or) equipment, possible types of danger must be identified at all stages of the life cycle (41) . For example, at present in Russia, the responsibility for the illegal consequences of the functioning of industrial robots is borne by their owners, manufacturers or operators.

Today, we still see statements about the need to

assign a "guardian" to each robot or electronic / mechanical entity, which will also facilitate the resolution of the issue of judicial representation. Such guardianship, with the implications for such a generally accepted institution, should be assigned to a certain category of professionals. This system of relationships should contribute to the ordering of the multiplicity of subjects of representation arising from the multi-functionality of robots. All of the above changes in the assessment of legal capacity will entail changes not only in civil legislation, but also in other norms of public law arising from these relationships.

5 | THE PRACTICE OF LEGAL REGULATION OF ROBOTS

One of the first countries to apply legal regulation in the field of artificial intelligence, as well as its carriers - robots or electronic / mechanical entity, was South Korea, where in 2008 the Law on Smart Robots was adopted (42) , in which they are legally identified in as mechanical devices that perceive the environment, recognize the circumstances in which they function, and endowed with the ability to move independently. The document only defines the development of robotics, focusing on the development issues of robotics, including measures of state support, but does not cover the entire range of problems (discourse) set out above.

The British, in contrast to the Koreans, began to discuss not only the practical benefits of robots, but also the ethical issues associated with the use of artificial intelligence. As reported by "Vesti" (Ukraine), in the spring of 2016, the British Standards Institute (BSI) published a "Guide to the ethical design and application of robots". This guide consists of many rules, including such basic ones as the prohibition to create robots that bring physical and psychological harm to humans, plus mandatory software transparency, the safety of robots, as well as human responsibility for machine actions (43) .

No legislation has been passed on the production and use of robots in the United States. But the omnipresent Microsoft founder Bill Gates, fearing the dominance of robots over humans in the near future, proposed taxing robots the same way as humans. In his opinion, in this way it will be possible to equalize ordinary workers from robots to the employer. On the other hand, he gives him certain rights that bring a robot closer to a human, putting it on the same financial level - in order to pay taxes; you need to pay the robot's labor (43) . But a well-known entrepreneur in the field of information technology does not take into account the natural inequality between the two categories of labor resources.

From the countries of the post-Soviet space, Estonia in 2017 amended its Law on Road Traffic of June 17, 2010 (44) to amend the legal regime of a "self-propelled robot", which is defined as one that moves on wheels or other running gear in contact with the ground, a partially or fully automatic or remotely controlled vehicle using sensors, cameras or other equipment to obtain information about the environment, capable of using this information to move (partially or completely) without the control of the driver. A very similar approach was taken in Germany, where on June 16, 2017 Eighth Act amending the Road Traffic Act (45) , which allowed the movement of vehicles, with highly or fully automated driving function. It also lists the signs that make it possible to legally identify such vehicles. Among them is the possibility for the driver to transfer control to himself or to deactivate the corresponding device.

A significant event in the world of robotics was the announcement in October 2017 at the Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh that the humanoid robot Sophia, developed by Hanson Robotics, granted the citizenship of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (46) . More specific information about the consequences of this act was not disclosed, although experts were interested in whether the robot received any rights or the government was just going to develop a system of rights for robots. Some of them criticized this decision, considering it wrong to grant citizenship to a robot in a situation where human rights are violated (47) .

At the level of the European Union, there have been discussions for a long time about the legality of adopting regulations with the aim of conferring the status of an "electronic entity" on machines with artificial intelligence. As a result, the MEPs took the path of institutionalizing such already factual social relations. Such institutionalization has been

embodied so far in the European Parliament resolution "Civil Law Rules on Robotics" in February 2017. It proposes a distinction in the concept of "robot" with the extension of the resolution specifically to "smart robots", which must be assigned an individual registration number, including data on the manufacturer, owner and conditions for payment of compensation in case of harm, with subsequent entry into a special register. Thus, consumers must find all the information they are interested in about the robot in the registry. The system should be maintained and controlled by a specialized agency for robotics and artificial intelligence, which could take on other aspects of regulation in this area. In addition, in this resolution, the European Parliament tried to look into the distant future, when completely independent robots will be able to get a job on their own, discuss the terms of contracts and decide how to fulfill them. In response, more than 150 experts in these fields, as well as law and ethics from 14 countries, signed an open letter to the European Parliament condemning its bill to grant robots status of legal personality. They are convinced that this initiative will allow manufacturers to evade responsibility for their "smart" inventions" (48) . So far, officials have not been able to agree on what rules will be responsible for the harm caused to people by a fully autonomous machine. This question is left for the near future (43) .

Today in Azerbaijan we do not observe the proper interest in this urgent legal problem. However, taking into account that international organizations and individual states are already looking for and finding methods and ways to protect human rights in the context of the onslaught of robotics, the Azerbaijani scientific and political community (legal scholars, politicians, legislators) should also seriously engage in the implementation of a wide range of norms into legislation (from banking, constitutional, criminal law, civil and administrative law to the protection of human rights in general) " (49) .

6 | CONCLUSION

So, stating a wide range of discussions on the proposed topic, it should be noted that today in the social life of its new participants as anthropotic machines with Artificial Intelligence. When socialized, these machines need legal formalization of their relations with people, which would bring clarity to their status and would specifically define their duties and responsibilities. Consequently, the idea of endowing robots (or their owners) with certain rights and responsibilities is being actualized as never before.

If we start in our studies from post-classical views on law, then we are able to theoretically explain the need to recognize the legal capacity of a new generation of machines and thus justify the granting of certain rights to them.

As it can be seen, G. Kelsen's "Pure Theory of Law" is most capable of theoretically substantiating the imposition of certain rights on robots, which would legally assume the status of an electronic / mechanical person. It should be taken into account that the term "electronic person" has already been adopted by both international and most national institutions.

Based on the approach of the theory of "pure law", it is concluded that an electronic person can be interpreted as a personified unity of legal norms that oblige and authorize artificial intelligence with the criteria of "rationality".

The study of the problems of legal capacity of electronic persons confirms the need to form a fundamentally new toolkit for legal regulation, which is associated with the specifics of electronic persons, characterized primarily by the difficulties of localizing their legally significant behavior.

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